Karl Otto Hondrich

Catastrophes cause people to learn; the same is true of innovations. It follows that catastrophes that are innovative in the sense that they are without precedent have a strong didactic effect. Indeed, in the wake of the meltdown of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor in the Soviet Union, some European countries learned very quickly that nuclear energy could and should be replaced by a new combination of other forms of energy, particularly solar energy, as well as energy-saving innovations. In contrast, some have cited a different lesson that should be learned from this catastrophe, namely, that it is supposedly both futile and impossible to extricate oneself from a trend that has become established on a global scale.

I do not want to discuss the question of energy resources but rather that of worldwide inevitability. Some sociocultural and technocultural patterns have become so pervasive worldwide that no country is in a strong enough position to ward them off. Markets, mass media, modern weaponry, sports competitions, blue jeans, pop music, government legitimation by majority consent, equal rights for men and women, nuclear power plants, and the nuclear family all belong to this set of technical and normative patterns. Global patterns such as these create the impression that societies all over the world are becoming ever more alike and that this trend is ineluctable.

This pattern may seem regrettable to us in some respects, but in other respects it is a source of hope. "Good" norms, such as mutual understanding and nonaggression in the framework of world government, may be disseminated and generally accepted as desirable future solutions to the world's most dangerous and potentially destructive conflicts, including thermonuclear war.

Rather than seeing such patterns solely as a source of hope, I argue that the risks inherent in the prevailing trends toward world unity, socio-ultural homogeneity, and efficiency in all areas outweigh the advantages. The more established such trends become, the more paradoxical their effects.

From this point of departure the question as to the ineluctability of prominent patterns becomes all the more crucial. Are there no other possible courses of development? I pose this question with the sociological classics in mind but get no answer. As I see it, there is no alternative to Spencer's and Durkheim's vision of social evolution as a unidirectional process of functional differentiation. I interpret the theories put forward by Marx, Weber, and Adam Smith as different versions of this same answer. I must turn to evolutionary biology in order to find two models of evolution within one paradigm.

Thus, in my short analysis of functional differentiation as the motor of modernity I point in particular to the paradoxes and pitfalls the concept entails. Reality protects itself against risks by resorting to segmentation, the counterpole to functional differentiation. The reality of modernization is to an increasing extent characterized not by functional differentiation replacing segmentation but by both principles cooperating in very subtle combinations. Biology and ecology, which both emphasize the evolutionary function of niches, take us one step further toward the rehabilitation of the principle of segmentation. Taking societies as the units of analysis, I juxtapose functional differentiation and segmentation in terms of their expression in the notions of "supersociety" and "niche societies" respectively. I understand the prevailing concept of modernization to mean the transformation of niche societies into supersociety by means of functional differentiation. In other words, the concept of modernization is theoretically one-sided, to say the least, and does not take into account its own risks and political implications. Although strong empirical, political, and moral support exists for the concept of modernization, a countervailing concept is in order that would, politically speaking, represent the interests of niche societies against those of the large and dominant societies. This concept, however, would present as far from satisfactory theory of evolution if it could not claim to be in the interest of evolution itself.

1. Paradoxes of Functional Differentiation

The sociological tradition makes use of a simple and convincing paradigm of Vergesellschaftung or social evolution: two or more small and relatively self-sufficient hordes merge—whether as a consequence of one dominating the other, outside pressure, or "free choice"—and form a new and larger social unit. Internally, this new unit tends to subdivide into functions and functional subgroups. This model of social evolution has a threefold advantage with regard to survival: it increases the power of the whole unit vis-á-vis its environment, it increases its internal power by providing a new and stronger form of integration, and it increases its efficiency by introducing the social division of labor.

The model of evolution has become the core of the theory, first elaborated by Spencer and Durkheim, that sees social evolution as an ongoing transformation from segmentary to functional differentiation. When we look at world society today, we see that the power of functionally specialized economic, scientific, and cultural subsystems is eroding the boundaries of the segments of national societies. Thus we may conclude may conclude that the process of functional differentiation is still under way.

It is useful to reconceptualize this "tranformational model" into the terminology of systems theory, making it an ideal type, free of historical connotations:

1.     Two or more social systems merge into one system. However, one can also consider the status quo ante as "one" system, consisting of several loosely connected segmentary subsystems. In any case, this transformation amounts to an increase in power and size.

2.     A variety of either dissimilar segments or loosely connected systems is replaced by a variety of dissimilar functions and functional subsystems within one strong system. This view is certainly not in accordance with the popular conception of functional differentiation. Nor is it in accordance with the view put forth in the classics. Durkheim and Spencer proceeded from the assumption that social segments are similar or homogeneous from the very beginning. Indeed, the clans and tribes of primitive societies may look similar when seen through our eyes, but in terms of their own self-description they are meaningfully distinct from each other and constitute a variety of social systems that are both heterogeneous and independent of one another. For them, functional differentiation means the transformation of their own particular sociocultural structures into more general ones. The same is true for these new systems. They have transformed heterogeneity into homogeneity. Spencer's dictum that evolution is the progression from homogeneity to heterogeneity is only true with respect to functions. As for sociostructural arrangements, there is an increase in homogeneity.

3.     The reduplication of any function or set of functions in two or more systems or subsystems is reduced. The principle involved is that functional differentiation must progress as far as possible, which means that it continues up to the point where there is only one structural representation (or one subsystem) remaining for each function in the system. The redundancy of functions and structural subsystems is transformed into uniqueness. This amounts to an increase in efficiency. Adam Smith's famous use of the example of pin production to illustrate the division of labor is a case in point. Thus, an increase in efficiency and a tendency toward the increasing uniqueness of functions and corresponding structural subsystems is implied in functional differentiation.

The list of the implications of functional differentiation as an ideal type can be extended to include the transformation of internal power relations, personalities, and micro-macro relationships. Our insights into functional differentiation are as yet very poor. Nevertheless, I end the list here for the time being and turn to the question of risks. What risks do social systems encounter as they approach the ideal type of modernization represented by functional differentiation? Following the order of the three points outlined above, I discuss the risks of largeness and power, the risks of homogeneity, and the risks of uniqueness and efficiency. In order to change the emphasis somewhat, I at times speak not of risks but rather of paradoxes or paradoxical developments. What is paradoxical is that social systems grow weak owing to their own largeness and strength.

The fact that systems are weakened by their very strength is the "paradox of largeness and power." Similarly, the "paradox of evolution" is that functional differentiation not only creates variety but also creates homogeneity and that homogeneity threatens to decelerate evolution. And it is also paradox that the increasing efficiency that results from decreasing redundancy makes systems more vulnerable because the slightest disturbance in one of the subsystems dramatically decreases the efficiency and viability of the whole system. I call this tendency the "paradox of efficiency."

1.1. The Paradox of Largeness and Power

The weakness of strong systems may be explained in several ways.

1.     As systems grow in size and elements, their contacts with other systems decrease because they have sufficient opportunities for a wide range of contacts within themselves. In large societies, as Peter M. Blau (1977) has argued, the ratio of internal to external interaction is higher than it is in small societies. This holds true for economic, cultural and social interaction. In other words, the amount large societies have to learn from small countries is not as much as small countries can learn from them. This analysis also suggests that large countries are more "closed" toward the flow of information from other countries and that small countries are more "open." This is true despite the fact that some large countries understand themselves to be "open societies" in the Popperian sense. This may also explain the greater incestuous conformity of sociocultural patterns within large societies as compared with smaller societies. Large numbers of elements thus have a negative effect on the receptiveness and diversity of large systems.

2.     Even if large systems do exchange information with smaller ones, they do not learn as much from small systems as small systems learn from them. For example, in the case of five million Americans having five million contacts with five million Swiss people, only about 2 percent of the population of the United States learns something about Switzerland but about 90 percent of the total population of Switzerland learns something about the United States.

3.     Inasmuch as large systems are powerful and power amounts to "the ability to afford not to learn" (Deutsch 1966, 111), large systems do not have to learn as much as small systems must in order to survive. Furthermore, the consciousness of being powerful enough not to have to learn may have an additional effect: lowering the tendency to learn. I call this tendency the "stubbornness" of large power systems.

4.     As Gödel has shown for mathematics, Turing for computers, and Hofstadter (1979, 101) has reminded us, all systems are incomplete and contradictory insofar as they cannot know or prove the consistency and completeness of themselves without resorting to assumptions from outside. From the point of view of cybernetics, one can add that systems cannot be self-steering if they do not receive information about their goals from outside. Large systems, which process less information from outside than do small systems, learn less about themselves and about their own contradictions than small systems and are therefore less in a position to determine an appropriate set of goals. In the extreme case of a supersystem that has absorbed all other systems to the point that it alone remains, the system completely loses any ability to set appropriate goals. As a consequence, it is also stripped of its self-steering capacity. This would hold true for a world state that had swallowed all other nation states.

1.2. The Paradox of Evolution

To understand the paradox of evolution, it is necessary to resort to a generalized version of the model of evolutionary biology. Evolution may be understood either (1) from the perspective of an ecological system, as increasing or maintaining the variety of all species, or (2) from the perspective of each species, as increasing its population and the variety of different individuals within this population. Each of these two perspectives puts the other in a dilemma. Additionally, a contradiction also exists between increasing numbers and variety. It is therefore wrong to confuse the evolutionary success of one species with that of a system of species. It is also misleading to measure the success of a species by its increasing numbers alone. Evolutionary "success" is an ambivalent and diffuse quality, and it is so for good reasons.

Living systems—among them, societies, as one form of social system—can be considered a species if they (1) possess a common set of features, and (2) reproduce themselves by the recombination and mutation of a certain number of basic elements (genes) drawn from a common genetic pool. There is a variety within this common pool, and the recombination and/or mutation of its elements makes for continuing and ever-new variety. However, selection reduces variety by increasing the number of individuals in a given population that are similar in the sense that they are best equipped for survival in a given environment. Such a tendency toward homogenization within a population takes a long time to assert itself and thus cannot be detected easily in very large and segmented populations, for example, the human species.

Species with small populations, however, are different. With a population of only 160—if we take membership in the United Nations as a rough indicator—the species of nation-states is exceptionally small. Thus, applying the paradox of evolution, the tendency of a species to destroy its own internal variety by homogenization of its population may be particularly strong within the species of nation-states. Homogenization by functional differentiation and homogenization by selection both work in the same direction. Should they be considered as two sides of the same phenomenon? As yet I am not sure. I am inclined to see a parallel, or even a synonymity, between the sociological notion of functional differentiation and the biological concept of a recombination and mutation of elements (genes). If this approach is correct, it makes the case for homogenization even stronger. Biologically speaking, homogenization does not commence with the process of selection. Rather it is triggered by the process of recombination and/or mutation.

1.3. The Paradox of Efficiency

The paradox of efficiency can be understood as the result of competition among several systems or subsystems that all fulfill the same function. The most efficient one will endure and incorporate the work done by the others. The realization of the principle "one function, one system" brings about maximum efficiency, not only because the most efficient system is the one that survives the competition but also because the energies of the embracing, higher-level system are applied most effectively Monopolization processes in markets are a case in point. The paradox arises not so much from an abuse of power but from the increased safety risks inherent in the unification process. If there is only system left to handle each function or set of functions, a defect in that system causes an inversion from highest efficiency to highest inefficiency.

An even stronger version of the paradox of uniqueness and efficiency may be derived from the theory of the hypercycle (Eigen and Schuster 1979), an explanation of the origin of life. Molecules that start reproducing themselves do so not on their own but in cooperation with others. This process, a hypercycle of reaction cycles, has many variants, but the "fittest" soon forces its competitors out of existence. This analysis explains the uniqueness of the genetic code for all living beings on earth. If we apply this to societies, their propensity to gradually merge—via functional differentiation and homogenization—into the uniqueness of one supersociety would eventually bring the process of societal reproduction to an end. In a species with a population of one there can be no self-reproduction in a cooperative hypercycle. In terms of cybernetics, a system that has no other systems of the same species left is highly endangered because it lacks not only cooperation but also competition. It is only through "cooperation by competition" that a system comes to know the possibilities open to it and the restrictions on it with regard to setting realistic goals. A "lonely system" loses its capacity for self-organization and condemns itself to death.

2. Segmentation and Niche Systems

Fortunately, the evolution of systems, and social systems in particular, does not follow the risky path suggested by the ideal-typical theory of functional differentiation. On the contrary, it makes great use of segmentary differentiation as a supplement to and a safeguard against the dangers of functional differentiation. Segmentation does the following:

1.     It breaks large systems down into small ones and reduces the power of the subsystems.

2.     It maintains and increases a variety of functionally equivalent structures with dissimilar sociocultural patterns despite the tendency toward homogenization.

3.     It creates redundancy in the form of similarity as a counter to the pressure toward uniqueness.

We are mistaken to look at segmentation as an alternative that replaces functional differentiation and leads to dedifferentiation. At least in the case of social systems, it would seem improbable that such systems simply "forget" the level of functional differentiation that they have already attained. Thus, even if there were a planned dedifferentiation of structures, second-level, underground structures that retain and preserve a higher degree of functional differentiation would remain.

But this is not my main point. What is crucial is that any step toward more functional differentiation invariably produces more segmentation as well. This is true at all levels of the system. At the level of society, functional differentiation has been pushed forward particularly by the formation of political and economic subsystems. Because of its increase in size, homogeneity, and uniqueness, the political subsystem can be regarded as a paradigmatic example of functional differentiation. And yet at the same time the very same process has led to the contrasting program of a socioemotional subsystem composed of families, friendships, private acquaintances, and intimate relationships, a subsystem segmented into many small systems, each with a high variety of structural patterns and a high degree of functional redundancy.

Within the second-level functional subsystems, segmentation is an ongoing process. In the political system we usually find a variety of parties and interest groups and regional and local governments. In the economic system segmentation occurs mainly among enterprises and households. In the single family segmentation comes to an end because of the smallness of the unit; instead we find different patterns of functional differentiation, both emotional and economic. In summary, Vergesellschaftung as societal evolution leads to an "architecture of complexity" (Simon [1969] 1981, 193), which is characterized not only by a hierarchy of systems, subsystems, subsubsystems, etc., but also a typical mixture of functional differentiation and segmentation, a mixture different for each subsystem and each level of subsystem. There is strong evidence that the range of freedom to change this mixture is very limited. It would not make sense to organize emotional-affective functions at the level of society by applying principles of functional differentiation. And yet conversely, to start organizing the economic and political spheres by segmentation would result in a tremendous loss of efficiency. Thus for all functional subsystems, there seems to be an appropriate (if not optimum) combination of the two principles of differentiation and segmentation. Social planning may change the weighting within this mix. In its attempt to "modernize" social structures, if often overemphasizes the functional principle, as in kibbutz education or in the central planning of an economy. As a result, segmentation is pushed into the underbelly of society, into unofficial structures such as black markets, informal groups, and secret networks of communication.

Generally speaking, any step toward changing social differentiation creates its opposite: diffuseness, a repository that embraces all those functions and relations that are no longer or still not accounted for or thematized by differentiation. The forms in which these functions and relations exist in unclear, uncertain and undetermined as well as covert, unconscious, and only latent. But exist they do. They are "the other side of the coin." Sociology does not look at this obverse side too often.

As differentiation does not destroy, but rather generates diffuseness, so the relationship between functional differentiation and segmentation is one of two opposing yet collaborative principles of evolution. Functional differentiation represents the dynamic, innovative, expanding, and risky aspects of evolution. Segmentation stands for preservation, stability, and the reduction of risks. We must abandon the classical model of social evolution that envisions progress from segmentation to functional differentiation. And we should also question the analogous model of modernization.

Such a revision of the transformational model opens up a wider range of interpretations of problems of evolution. Some of these problems arise not because there is "still too much" segmentation but because there is "not yet enough" segmentation in evolving social systems. Segmentation cannot be regarded as completely rehabilitated if it is only thought of as the companion of functional differentiation. It is more than that because it is an originating source of evolution itself. To understand this more fully, let us again consult the biological and ecological model of evolution. As explained above, the evolutionary process that leads to the homogenization and/or the extension of the population of a species is only one alternative within the transformational model. Another would be evolution through the formation and isolation of niches.

Niches are the set of conditions by which a part of the population of a species lives in the relative specialization, isolated from the rest. To find a niche means to find or establish boundaries preventing the unlimited exchange of contacts with the rest (or majority) of the population. Thus the recombination of genes is restricted to the niche population, which is another way of saying that this group is protected from having to compete with the rest of the population on their terms.

In a number of isolated ecosystems each will unquestionably follow evolutionary dynamic processes of its own as a result either of random shocks or of environmental differences. This will lead to a very much larger number of different species in totality [that is, different ways of life in the total population] than would a single, large ecosystem, in which many of the mutations that have survival value in the small system would not have survival value in the large. (Boulding 1978, 113)

This model of niche development amounts to "evolution by segmentation." The niche forms the segment in which one or a few individual systems develop their own peculiarities independently of the other systems.

The isolation of niches, therefore, leads to a variety of systems that are functionally equivalent but structurally distinct from one another. As societies, the United States, the Soviet Union, Sweden, and South Africa all have the same function but each fulfills this function via totally different sociostructural patterns. As elements of the "higher" system of international society, however, these societies fulfill different functions or play different roles, such a competing superpowers, neutrals, even outcasts (see Luard 1976, 259ff.). Redundancy exists within this higher system in the sense that the functional subsystems—the economic and political spheres, the socialization system, etc.—are each replicated many times, in both similar and different forms. The similarity of patterns has its survival value. If one system disappears, others make sure that the pattern endures. And yet the variety of patterns has its survival value too. Systems can choose between different patterns, they can recombine different patterns, or they can learn from the differences in one another's patterns.

Certain conditions must be fulfilled in order for niche-produced variety to become important in terms of evolution:

1.     Niches should not be too small. Large systems have a better chance of producing improbable mutations and of protecting these against outside interference.

2.     Adaptation to niches should not go too far. Niches are in a continual state of change. If the niche shrinks too much, the population that is too well adapted to this niche will cease to exist as a distinct entity. Adaptability, however, increases the capacity of a given population to expand niches or to find new niches. Catastrophe favors adaptability and eliminates the previously well-adapted but unadaptable (Boulding 1978, 111, 114).

3.     Mutations or innovations that generate increased complexity, especially those that increase adaptability, have a better chance to discovering new niches than do those that reduce complexity.

4.     Niches that are too open to their environment will be invaded by populations that are either more complex or greater in size and power and will thus lose their distinctness.

5.     Niches that close themselves off too much forfeit the chance to become more complex by absorbing innovations from outside; they will not be able to expand.

Opening and closing are important strategies for increasing and preserving variety (Klapp 1978). Evidence for this point is provided by socialist countries in Easter Europe; they have become open societies today by admitting many new elements of political and economic culture, thus increasing their internal variety.

3. The Prospects for the Evolution of World Societies

How strong are the trends in the international system of societies toward functional differentiation? And what are the chances for niche societies to oppose this tendency?

Society may be seen as an interesting species of living systems. It appears late in the history of evolution, which moves from the physical to the biological to the societal level (Boulding 1978, 29–30). Among social systems, society is also a latecomer. It is characterized by its degree of coordinative or synthesizing power: "More inclusive of controls over action than all others …, a type of social system, in any universe of social systems, which attains the highest level of self-sufficiency as a system in relation to its environment" (Parsons 1966, 2, 5). Today we would be critical of such a definition, knowing that all living systems are self-sufficient in the sense that they are self-organizing that they are not self-sufficient because in order to reproduce themselves they require the cooperation of many others systems of numerous different levels.

Thus, the most important difference between society and other social systems is the symbolic social meaning attributed to society. It represented a "higher" social system that symbolized the unity of social organization at a time (in the eighteenth century) when such a unity was already fragmented and continually endangered by ongoing functional differentiation. In this situation the search for society as the symbol of unity had completely contradictory results. On the one hand, the unity and identity of the whole seemed to be best represented by the political subsystem as the locus of control over a territory with visible geographical boundaries. On the other hand, Hegel viewed society as something that included both the family and the economy, two subsystems with different boundaries that were otherwise overlooked in the political understanding of the term. The paradox of society is that it came into beings as a symbol for unity at the very time that unity was disappearing.

The species "society," although comprising less than 200 "individuals," shows a remarkably high degree of dissimilarity. These dissimilarities include (1) both very big and very small individuals in terms of territorial boundaries; (2) both growing and shrinking individuals that result from the reproductive strength or weakness of their respective elementary parts; (3) both strong and chaotic individuals with respect to internal normative control, self-organization, and outlook; and (4) both independent and dependent individuals.

It is peculiar to the species "society" that it may reproduce itself either by segmentation, that is, by increasing its population and decreasing the size of its individuals, or by means of (frequently coercive) functional differentiation, that is, by decreasing the population in favor of ever larger individuals.

Both segmentation and functional differentiation can be perceived in world society today. Segmentation took place particularly after World War I (the division of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) and World War II (the division of Germany and Korea) as well as in the course of decolonization. Within the same period Soviet and Chinese societies grew larger in size. Contemporary societies in Western Europe have retained their territorial identity but seem gradually to be merging their norms and control mechanisms. Some African cases, however, illustrate reproduction by territorial integration without a concomitant successful integration of control norms. What has been most remarkable, however, has been the development of three superpowers, each characterized by its large size, its large population, and its high degree of complexity—although each superpower is complex different ways. All three illustrate the paradox of largeness. Chinese society has made recent attempts to overcome this paradox by means of birth control, by opening its borders to knowledge from abroad, and by introducing market segmentation. The result has been an increase in the degree of segmentary independence and learning within China. In the Soviet Union, however, the paradox continued to flourish unabated until the system practically broke down. The traditional insularity of the system and its overemphasis on functional differentiation have led to the centralization of political and economic activity without the concomitant exploitation of the learning potential inherent in independent and competitive segments (parties, enterprises, and interest groups). These characteristics lead to the kind of inflexibility and deficient adaptability expressed by the paradox of largeness. The United States may be proud of its openness and the philosophy and structures of conflicting and competitive segments that it upholds, but this trust that these structures are the best suited to solve problems can prevent Americans from seeing that such structures cannot solve the paradox of largeness and power. As a consequence of its largeness, the United States has developed many self-steering mechanisms at the local and regional level. The attention of the public—and of the politicians who rely on public consent—is focused on these events, and not on what is going on outside. Compare, in this respect, the ratio of international and local information contained in American and is Swiss or Dutch newspapers.

The "inner-directedness" of social self-sufficiency of large societies would not in itself pose a problem if these societies were not in the position of being superpowers in relation to small societies. Virtually all societies in Western and Eastern Europe are protectorates of the superpowers, inasmuch as they are not able to defend themselves against the superpower that represents the other side. Nobody likes to have to depend on somebody else, especially if the other person is powerful and as a consequence of his size-induced self-centeredness does not really understand and care about the other. This is not a moral dilemma that can be solved by an effort on the part of the powerful "to understand others." It is, as the paradox of largeness teaches us, a sociostructural "dilemma of asymmetrical understanding," which resists even the best intentions of the powerful systems. As a consequence, they run into a threefold complex of misunderstandings. First, they do not understand the small and dependent systems to the same degree that these systems understand them. Second, they do not understand that they cannot understand the small societies sufficiently, even if they were to make an effort to do so. Third, they do not understand why the small societies think that they are misunderstood, and small societies do not understand why they are not sufficiently understood. As a result, everybody gets angry.

Turning to the paradox of evolution, at first glance there seems to be no empirical evidence that supports its existence in world society. The number of independent state-societies is increasing and the variety of their cultural patterns is very great. However, there is some diffusion of common norms—for instance, where child labor or discrimination against women is concerned—all over the world. The work of international organizations such as ILO and UNCTAD gives us an idea of what the increasing body of commonly accepted norms is like.

The trend toward a homogenization of technocultural and sociocultural patterns is even more striking, a trend that persists in both official and unofficial forms. Some might argue that in the course of the gradual expansion of homogeneity throughout world society, there has been an expanding of cultural heterogeneity as well, that is, the mixture of the diffusing modern elements with the remaining traditional elements in each society creates new and specific sociocultural patterns and life-styles. This heterogeneity, however, is only meaningful to a certain degree because at another level of abstraction the new patterns and life-styles that result from the mixture of the modern and the traditional merely lead once more to the homogenization of societies. They all become multifaceted societies, permitting the existence and practice of many different life-styles at a time. This coexistence of the traditional and the modern, of individualized and standardized life-styles can be described, albeit incompletely, using the concept of the "dual society." In most countries this has increasingly given way to a "multifold society."

In many countries of the Third World the modern "international" sector is declared to be the official one, whereas in others (such as Iran) and in countries of the socialist camp it forms an unofficial structure, a "second society" (Hankiss, 1985). Be this as it may, those goods, norms, and social patterns that bring about homogenization among and within societies are and must be considered to be the most modern, dynamic, and important ones—or, from the point of view of the traditionalist, the most dangerous ones.

The most remarkable aspect of societal homogenization is its asymmetric character. Unlike human reproduction, in which both sides have an equal chance to be represented in the recombination of genes, one side is almost always disadvantaged in the recombination of technocultural and sociocultural patterns. The side that offers the highest degree of complexity or the strongest combination of complexity and power dominates. In world society today this is the side of the United States. American society is the leading society in the sense that it diffuses its sociocultural patterns and products in what amounts to a one-way process. Other big countries, such as the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and Europe, do not send as many or such important things back to the United States as they receive from it. And countries in the Third World do not copy as many patterns and things from other leading societies as they do from the United States.

One explanation for this one-way dynamism is the fact that the United States, as an immigrant society, is traditionally open to the most dynamic elements of other countries. It does not import them as products or institutions but integrates them in the form of the personal "know-how" of the pizzamaker, the rocket engineer, or the scientist. World society receives the dynamic elements imported into the United States back from the United States in a transformed and enriched form.

The last step in the homogenization of world society would, of course, be the disappearance of state borders. In reality, the borders are only being eroded, not abolished. Diversity is covertly being eroded while officially the diversity and independence of state societies is respected.

If the significant variety of different societies is decreasing, then evolution must also be losing its capacity to recombine and select variety at the level of society. But why should recombination and selection not be going on "below" and "above" the level of state society? Below—or, rather, in addition to—the level of state society exist functionally specific segments of enterprises and households, universities and schools, etc., that could still exist in the absence of the nation-state. They could maintain their selectively by competing with one other: one scientific community pitted against another, and both against religious communities. The public, be it by means of market or quasi-market procedures, could be the arbiter in such processes of selection. But could not a world state play the role of arbiter in exactly the way that the existing nation-state does? After all, the nation-state at present already takes care of the functioning of markets, protects the family, allocates research funds to different scientific enterprises, and so on. An evolutionary superstate could quite plausibly guarantee the maintenance of the evolutionary potential for diversity.

However, a world state could not substitute for the regulatory functions of the state itself. Where politics and the judiciary are concerned, a loss of diversity seems inevitably. Legitimately, there can only be one political and legal order prevalent in one place at one time (although there may be federal and communal substructures). Thus, a supranational world state would mean the end of existing alternatives and competition with regard to political and judicial cultures. In other words, only a variety of nation-states or camps of nation-states can guarantee the evolution of political and legal structures by recombination and selection of alternatives.

A superstate efficiently enforcing common norms in the face of the conflicting interests of nation-states is one of the most hopeful visions for world peace. Unfortunately, this vision is inextricably bound up with the paradox of uniqueness and efficiency. The more efficient a world state is, the more it destroys its own functional alternatives, that is, the environment of systems of the same kind that have to cooperate as one learning system in order to find out what the appropriate functions and limitations of the state are. In addition, as far as nonstate functions and institutions are concerned, even a superstate aiming at diversity runs the risk of favoring either the wrong alternatives or too few alternatives. Finally, in view of the accumulation of regulatory power necessary for the management of world society, a superstate simply magnifies the risks implied in social largeness and power.

In opposition to the prevailing trends in world society toward both large supersociety and a decreasing variety of technocultural and sociocultural patterns among societies, is there a chance for niche societies to escape to a certain degree?

Niches, at the level of societal evolution, do not exist by virtue of nature or fate alone; they can be made by social effort. An effort certainly is necessary if niche societies are to become a successful alternative to the supersociety. This effort has to take into consideration the conditions, mentioned earlier, under which niche systems arise, if these systems are to be relevant from the point of view of evolution. Niche societies should not be so small, powerless, and niche-adapted that they are reduced to an existence of museumlike preservation. They should be complex and open enough to enter into a limited but fruitful exchange with the supersociety.

Primitive societies may be so far removed from modern societies in this respect that they do not even belong to the same species, as Giesen (1980) has argued. Consequently, the chances of finding niches that are meaningful to evolution increase with the levels of complexity and power of societies. And niches cannot be found within the boundaries of the nation-state or a federation of states alone; the concept of variable niches presupposes a flexibility of changing coalitions. For example, there may be a European-Arab niche with regard to the development of solar energy but not in terms of a common religious pattern.

The concept of niche evolution at the societal level has its own paradox: It is successful to the extent that niche systems are powerful enough to protect themselves against world trends and that they have complex alternatives to offer to complex mainstream problems. Unfortunately, the success of niche systems serves also to reproduce the paradoxes of largeness and power and of evolution within the niches.

But these are the problems of the day after tomorrow. The problem facing niche societies today is the extreme difficulty of developing alternative technocultural and sociocultural patterns in opposition to the dominating and homogenizing trend that emanates from the favors the leading societies. There seems to be a law of increasing power differences. Innovations that are disseminated by the leading countries to the rest of the world strengthens the superiority of the leading societies for three reasons.

1.     The leading societies are superior in terms of resources and so their own innovations and follow-up innovations have a competitive edge.

2.     The leading societies also have a competitive advantage inasmuch as the innovation is a product of their own societal culture, which is likely to encounter difficulties or "implantation cost" in other societies.

3.     The leading societies have, in most cases, an advantage of power: power is the chance to promote a solution to the disadvantage of better solutions.

In this situation the development of niche societies not only amounts to creating a countervailing power. It also means a change in competition in the sense that niche societies reject the worldwide competition for those patterns and solutions that are offered by the leading societies. For the reasons just outlined, to accept this competition would be to continually strengthen and increase the differences in power and welfare between the leading societies and the rest of the world. The chance open to the niche society is not to avoid all competition but to offer indirect competition in the form of different sociocultural patterns problem-solving devices. Niche societies want to be free in their choice of realms of competition.

Although most of us cherish values of pluralism and multiculturalism, in the final instance we are hardly prepared to accept the images of niche societies that are really their own. Fundamentalism in Iran is usually interpreted as a backlash against modernization processes that were enforced in that country too quickly and too strictly. The common view is that it constitutes a temporary obstacle to further modernization. But perhaps we should accept it as a valid and valuable sociocultural pattern of its own.

As I see it, the concept of niche evolution is a necessary theoretical and political complement to the prevailing concept of a functional differentiation that culminates in the vision of a supersociety. Admittedly, the obstacle and resistances to the realization of niche societies are stronger than the forces in its favor. Any planned effort will probably not be enough if it is not supported by the tacit work of the paradoxes I discussed in this chapter, paradoxes that can be seen as the self-regulating mechanism of social systems and that function to ensure that the "trees do not grow up into skies," as a German saying would have it.

References

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